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EVIDENCE
ALEXANDER

C. Ross*

INTRODUCTION

With the exception of relevancy, which will be given emphasis in this
article, no area of the law of evidence received outstandingly significant
treatment by the Florida courts during the period of this Survey. Most of
the new material would come under the heading of an explanation of
previous law. It will be noted that the particular rules governing expert
witnesses and opinion evidence continued to expand -with no special
significance, except possibly in their quantity.
EXPERT WITNESSES AND OPINION EVIDENCE

The frequent use of expert witnesses has led to a case by case listing
of what is and what is not a proper subject of expert testimony, the test
usually being phrased in terms of whether the subject is without the
common knowledge of the average juror. Many of the other cases involve
a scrutiny of the means by which the expert arrived at his opinion.
An expert on lottery organizations, who was present at a raid that led
to the arrest of the defendant, was allowed to give his opinion as to what
was occurring (a lottery), although it was an ultimate fact.' The nature of
a lottery operation is not known to the average juror. For the same reason it
was error to exclude expert testimony as to the average person's reaction
time and distance required to stop a given vehicle at a given speed under
given conditions of road surface. 2 Also, a juror "is not competent to
determine whether a disputed signature or writing was made by the same
person whose admittedly genuine signature or writing is in evidence, without
the aid of skilled or expert testimony." A highway patrolman's testimony
as to the point of impact in an accident was held to be inadmissible, but
the court's decision was unclear as to whether it was because the patrolman
4
was not an expert or because his testimony invaded the province of the jury.
It was reversible error to admit the testimony of a naval commander,
qualified as an expert, who gave an opinion that a car was traveling at a
certain rate of speed, basing his opinion on a formula for the computation
*Associate Editor of the University of Miami Law Review.
-1.Diecidue v. State, 1-19 So.2d 803 (Fla. App. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 131
So.2d 7 (Fla. 1961).
2. Mathews v. Carlson, 130 So.2d 625 (Fla. App. 1961).
3. Clark v. State, 114 So.2d 197, 203 (Fla. App. 1959).
4. Mills v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 127 So.2d 453 (Fla. App. 1961).
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of the velocity of a projectile at the instant of launch. This opinion was
not only based on speculative facts, but it omitted factors relevant to an
5
accurate calculation, thereby rendering the testimony doubly valueless.
An expert's testimony concerning the speed of a car in a negligence action
"may be based, in part at least, upon the results of tests or experiments
made by him," but will be disallowed if not "made under conditions substantially similar to those which prevailed at the time of the accident."6
Whether substantial similarity exists is to be left to the discretion of the
trial court. When no opinion as to speed in miles per hour was given,
testimony that a bus was driven "faster than usual," without showing its
usual rate of speed or how fast it was going, does not furnish a basis for
finding that an improper speed was used, and therefore is inadmissible. 7
The "depth rule," which "is predicated on various factors, including
one which gives a value to each foot of a lot from front to rear based on
its percentage in relation to the value of the entire lot,"8 is considered to
be a reliable method in reaching an opinion on the value of condemned
property, and thus may be used by expert witnesses. In FloridaPower Corp.
V. Wenze 9 the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of the condemnor's expert witnesses on the value of the land in question was reversed
on two grounds: first, because the court of appeal considered that the
experts were qualified and second, because the effect was to "strip [the
condemnor] of any expert testimony on the market value of the property
interests taken."' 10 An owner of property, though not qualified as an
expert, may testify as to its value, since he is familiar with its uses and purposes. But ownership of property by a corporation does not automatically
qualify its officers to give testimony on the property's value. It must be
shown that a particular officer has sufficient knowledge about the property
to qualify him to testify." By implication then, "sufficient knowledge"
would be that degree of knowledge about a particular piece of property
that an individual owner would have.
An interesting problem was presented in City of Coral Gables v.
Brasher,'2 in which the city's doctor testified that a police officer's heart
condition was not service incurred and the police officer's doctor testified
that it was so incurred. The court held that the city had not rebutted the
statutory presumption that the injury was service incurred, since hopelessly

1959).

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Le Fevre v. Baer, 113 So.2d 390 (Fla. App. 1959).
Huff v. Belcastro, 127 So.2d 476, 479 (Fla. App. 1961).
Blackman v. Miami Transit Co., 125 So.2d 128 (Fla. App. 1960).
Jacksonville Expressway -Authority v. Milford,, 115 So.2d 778, 782 (Fla. App.
113 So.2d 747 (Fla. App. 1959).
Id. at 751.
Salvage & Surplus, Inc. v. Weintraub, 131 So.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1961).
132 So.2d 442 (Fla. App. 1961).
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as if none at all had

On the question of whether a will was forged, it was within the province
of the trial judge to accept the testimony of the attorney who drew the will
and his secretary, both of whom testified that they saw the deceased sign
the will, over the testimony of a handwriting expert who testified that the
will was forged.' a
PRIVILEGE

The trial court may compel the disclosure of the identity of an informer

only if his identity is material. In a prosecution for the unlawful possession
of moonshine whiskey, the court pointed out that the informer was not a
participant in the crime (as he might be, for example, in a prosecution for
the sale of moonshine). The court was of the opinion that his identity was
not material, and the state's privilege to withhold the identity of persons
who furnish information relating to violations of the law had to be
4
recognized.1
IMPEACHMENT

In Minton v. State 5 the defendant's counsel made a pre-trial motion
to inspect the grand jury proceedings, his intent being to prepare his defense.
The motion was denied. On appeal, the supreme court held that the Florida
statute authorizing the disclosure of grand jury testimony 6 only applies to
pre-trial inspection of testimony upon which a charge of perjury or subornation of perjury is based-and the testimony cannot be inspected in order
to prepare a defense.' 7 A second point raised on appeal was the denial,
during cross-examination of a witness, of the defendant's oral motion for
permission to inspect the grand jury testimony of the witness for the
purpose of laying a foundation for impeachment. The court held that,
except in perjury cases,
something more than a . . . speculation that a witness's testimony

at the trial is inconsistent with that given before the grand jury
must be made to appear in order to hold a trial judge in error for8
refusing to lift the veil of secrecy from the grand jury proceedings.'
The defendant's main contention was that the trial judge had a duty to
read the grand jury testimony of the witness in question in order to ascertain
whether or not the ends of justice required him to allow the defense counsel
to inspect it before further cross-examination of the witness. In upholding
13. In re Grant's Estate, 123 So.2d 560 (Fla. App. 1960).

14. Sta-e v. Hardy, 114 So2d 344 (Fla. App. 1959).
15. 113 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1959).
16. FLA. STAT. . 905.27 (1961).
17. Minton v. State, 113 So.2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1959).
18. Id. at 365.
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the trial court's refusal to do so, the court stated that many reasons favoring
secrecy of grand jury testimony (protection of the jurors, promotion of
complete freedom of disclosure, etc.) must be weighed against the necessity for disclosure. The defense counsel's speculation that the witness
might be testifying differently at the trial was not enough to overcome the
need for secrecy. The trial judge cannot be required to stop the proceedings and read grand jury testimony every time counsel asks him to. The
court offered no clear criterion of when the trial judge should do this, but
it pointed out that many federal courts follow this procedure and quoted 1
the opinion of Judge Sobeloff in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States,20 which extensively discusses the problem. The net conclusion is
that much is left to the discretion of the trial court judge, a "sufficient
reason" and "proper predicate" being his concise guidelines.
In Hoyt v. State21 the defendant was being tried for the murder of
her husband. The defense was that their marital relationship so affected
the defendant's state of mind that she was not criminally responsible for
her acts. Testimony concerning her staying out late with another man
was admitted over the defendant's objection that it attacked her character,
which had not been made an issue. The appellate court upheld the admission on the grounds that, since the defense was directed toward the defendant's state of mind, "evidence of other events vitally affecting the marital
relation, and bearing upon her alleged state of mind, was properly admitted
'22
in impeachment.
Section 317.1723 of the Florida Statutes provides that no "accident
reports" made by persons in accidents shall be used in any trial arising out
of the accident and that the reports shall be without prejudice to the person
so reporting. The defendant (in a negligence action) had given a report
to one officer at the scene of the accident and a similar one to another
officer, at the police station, in relation to possible criminal charges. The
testimony of the second officer about the report was admitted to impeach
the defendant's testimony at the trial. The court of appeal reversed and
remanded for a new trial, holding that both types of report came within the
prohibition of section 317.17, despite the fact that the second report was
' 24
not part of an "accident report.
In H. I. Holding Co. v. Dade County25 it was held that it is within the
trial court's discretion to decide how far cross-examination can go in an

19. Id. at 367.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

260 F.2d. 397, 404 (4th Cir. 1958).
119 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1959), aff'd, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
Id. at 696.
FLA. STAT. § 317.17 (1961).
Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So.2d 704, 706 (Fla. App. 1961).
129 So.2d 693 (Fla. App. 1961).
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attempt to establish bias. Here, the court upheld the disallowance of the
condemnee's question as to how much an expert witness received from the
county for his services.
COMPETENCY

Section 90.0726 of the Florida Statutes provides that a conviction of
perjury makes one incompetent to testify. In Gordon v. State27 it was held
that those who have pleaded guilty to a perjury charge, but have not yet
been adjudged guilty, may testify. The question of competency also arose
in Ferrer v. State,2 in which the court stated that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in finding a child competent to testify when she stated
that she thought something would happen to her if she "told ...a story"
29
after promising to tell "nothing but the truth.
AMs

TO MEMORY

Under certain circumstances a witness may refresh his memory by referring to notes made by another person. In Chaudoin v. State80 the allowance of this practice was approved on the grounds that the witness was
present when the notes were made, personally supervised the activity to
which the notes related, had personal knowledge of and was familiar with
the contents of the notes at the time they were made, and the notes were
original entries made by a person under the supervision of the witness
contemporaneously with the finding of the facts set forth in the notes.
HEARSAY

In an automobile negligence case it was held that not all hospital records connected with a patient's case are admissible as "hospital records." 81
The records in question were entitled "progress notes" and "consultation
notes." Apparently, the court was impressed with the unofficial appearance
of these records in holding that their hearsay content made them inadmissible. In Fendrick v. Faeges32 the defendant attempted to introduce
a statement made to an employee of his attorney by the hospitalized plaintiff. The inadmissibility of this evidence as an "admission against interest"
was upheld on the grounds that section 92.3333 of the Florida Statutes had
not been complied with. This section makes a statement like the one

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

FLA. STAT. § 90.07 (1961).

119 So.2d 753 (Fla. App.
117 So.2d 529 (Fla. App.
Id. at 530.
118 So.2d 569 (Fla. App.
Chilton v. Dockstader, 126
117 So.2d 858 (Fla. App.
FLA. STAT.

§ 92.33 (1961).

1960).
1960).
1960).
So.2d 281 (Fla. App. 1961).
1960).
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involved here inadmissible until it is shown that a copy was furnished to
34
the person making the statement.
The condemnor's estimate of just compensation, as contained. in the
declaration of taking, is not a declaration against interest that would preclude
the condemnor from relying upon evidence of a value less than that originally
35
estimated.
In a murder trial a witness testified that just prior to the shooting, the
deceased stated that the defendant had been drinking and was waving a
pistol around.3 6 When these statements were made, the deceased and the
witness were outside a house and the defendant was inside. The deceased
and the defendant had had a conversation which was heard by the witness,
but at no time did the witness see the defendant, nor did he recognize the
defendant's voice. The court stated that the identification of the person
inside the house as the defendant was sufficient in that the deceased had
referred to him by name. It was held that the statements made by the
deceased were admissible as part of the "res gestae" and were not hearsay.
Although the court used the unfortunate phrase, "res gestae," it clarified
somewhat the reasons for allowing the introduction of this evidence by going
on to say that such statements are admissible if they "have a relevant bearing," "throw light upon the motives and intention of the parties," and are
contemporaneous with the act in issue, so as to preclude the presumption
of premeditation. 37 Despite this clarification by the court, "res gestae"
seems to this writer to be an extremely vague criterion of admissibility.
Under this rule, it is difficult to ascertain whether the evidence is admissible because it is not hearsay or because it comes under an exception to
the hearsay rule.
The plaintiff's admission, in a deposition, that it was her "impression"
that one of two defendants was not responsible for the accident in question
did not bar her recovery against that defendant because her "impression"
was not based on observation (she was struck from behind), but rather was
a conclusion.88
MORTALITY TABLES

Standard mortality tables are admissible even though the injured plaintiff, due to a particular physical condition, has a much shorter life expectancy
than the average person. In City of Tampa v. Johnson"9 tables showing a
normal life expectancy of 28.18 years were admissible, despite medical evi34.
35.
modified,
36.
37.
38.

Fendrick v. Faeges, 117 So.2d 858 (Fla. App. 1960).
Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Bennett, 124 So.2d 307 (Fla. App. 1960),
131 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1961).
Washington v. State, 118 So.2d 650 (Fla. App. 1960).
Id. at 653.
Pfeiffer v. Shonfed, 128 So.2d 6 (Fla. App. 1961).

39. 114 So.2d 807 (Fla. App. 1959).
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dence that the plaintiff's probable life expectancy was from two to three
and a half years. The court stated that the plaintiff's particular condition
affects the weight of the mortality table evidence and not its admissibility.
The tables are not binding on the jury and are only one of many factors
to be considered. The same was true in another case,40 in which the court
approved of instructions which advised the jurors to consider the tables
along with other evidence and their personal experience in trying to ascertain
41
the period they felt the plaintiff would live.
RELEVANCY

In the evidence section of a prior Survey, 42 the author pointed out that
43
the Florida Supreme Court had, in the case of Williams v. State,
approached the problem of the admissibility of . . .other crime

evidence in terms of a rule of admissibility rather than a rule of
exclusion. The court took the position that the proper approach
was not to consider the admissibility of the evidence on the basis
of an exception to the rule excluding such evidence, but rather that
the problem was a basic one of relevancy and concluded that 'the
proper rule simply is that relevant evidence will not be excluded
merely because it relates to 44similar facts which point to the commission of a separate crime.'
During the period of the present Survey, the supreme court had several occasions to apply this test of the admissibility of other crime evidence.
In Mackiewicz v. State45 the court upheld the admission of evidence of
the defendant's prior robbery of another hotel and his cell-mate's testimony
which included a reference to the prior robbery. The court quoted the
Williams case, saying that "the test of admissibility is relevancy. The test
of inadmissibility is a lack of relevancy. ' 40 The court did not mention a
balance between logical relevancy and undue prejudice that might arise
through the introduction of evidence of other crimes. Relevancy was the
sole criterion. Although this test alone would seem to allow the introduction of evidence that would have been held inadmissible before the Williams
case, the court put limits on free admissibility by saying that the evidence
was relevant because it tended to show the defendant's motive. This brings
the court's approach closer to that which existed before the Williams case

40. Butler v. Borowsky, 120 So.2d 656 (Fla. App. 1960).
41. Id. at 659.
42. Touby, Evidence, Fourth Survey of Fla. Law, 14 U. MIAMI L. REv. 319 (1959).
43. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
44. Touby, supra note 42, at 323.
45. 114 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1959).
46. Id. at 688.
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a general rule of exclusion, with exceptions (when the other crime evidence
tends to prove motive, scheme, etc.) allowing the evidence to be introduced.
Next, in another Williarns case, 47 the supreme court did balance logical
relevancy and undue prejudice when it held that evidence of a subsequent
crime was relevant, but that the state went too far and introduction of
testimony concerning the later crime "transcended the bounds of relevancy
to the charge being tried, and made the later offense a feature instead of an
incident." 48 But, in a third case, in which the defendant was being tried for
shooting a police officer who was pursuing him after a burglary, the supreme
court upheld the allowance of evidence that the defendant had escaped
from a prison camp a year before, since it was relevant to the showing of a
motive for shooting the police officer.4 9 The court stated that the first
Williams case had discarded the exclusion-exception rule and cited Mackiewicz for the proposition that "any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is
admissible [except those which are used only to point up bad character or
criminal propensities]."5
Whether these decisions will make any substantive difference in the
kind of evidence that can be introduced is difficult to evaluate, for the
courts have continued to use the language of the exclusion-exception rule,
saying that particular evidence (which would have been admissible before
because it was an exception to the exclusion-of-other-crime-evidence rule) is
now admissible because it is "relevant." For example, the First District
Court of Appeal held that evidence of a conspiracy to commit other burglaries was admissible in a trial for murder committed during a burglary
because it was relevant - relevant because it tended to show a common
scheme or plan.51 On the other hand, the Third District Court of Appeal
held that in an arson trial, evidence that the defendant set fifteen other
fires was not relevant and was used to "inflame" the jurors.. 2 The court
was careful to point out that the evidence was not excluded because it related
to similar crimes, but because it was inadmissible due to the lack of
relevancy. It is submitted that this is a strange way of balancing logical
relevancy and undue prejudice -excluding prejudical evidence that is
obviously relevant by calling it "irrelevant."
A further indication of the Florida courts' refusal to set up clear guide
lines for trial courts to use in balancing prejudice against relevancy is found
in two cases involving the admissibility of photographs of the murder victim.
In one case the court stated, "when photographs are otherwise relevant they
will not be held incompetent merely because they tend to prejudice the
-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1960).
Id. at 475.
Johnson v. State, 130 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1961).
Id. at 600.
Griffin v. State, 124 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1960).
Hooper v. State, 115 So.2d 769 (Fla. App. 1959).
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jury.' '53 One might surmise that another court would hold the same
photograph not "otherwise relevant" if it thought the effect would be to
inflame the jurors. In the second case the court said, "the fact that the
scene presented is one which would likely arouse the passion and prejudice
of the jury does not render them inadmissible, ''5 4 but they should be
admitted with great caution.
In an unrelated area, it was held that original court files of other cases
may be introduced into evidence if relevant, but the practice should be
discouraged. 5
In a negligence action involving a fall in a supermarket, the plaintiff
introduced the affidavit of an employee of the market containing a statement that sometimes the bagboys would let loose pieces of lettuce fall to
the floor. The court pointed out that the affidavit was not relevant to
the issue of negligence since it did not show that the dangerous condition
existed at the time of the accident.5 6
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

No matter how convincing the proof is that a carbon copy is an

exact duplicate of the original letter, the proper predicate for admission of
the carbon copy is to serve notice for the production of the original. If
57
this is not done, the carbon copy is inadmissible.
INFERENCE UPON AN INFERENCE

The problem of the rule against constructing "an inference upon an
inference" was again presented to the Florida courts during the period of this
Survey. The court in Nielsen v. City of Sarasota58 stated the general rule
that in a civil case, a fact may be established by circumstantial evidence
(e.g., an inference of negligence), but a further inference (e.g., proximate
cause) cannot be constructed upon the first one unless the first one "was
established to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences." 59 (The
court also pointed out that the "criminal rule permits proof of guilt by
circumstantial evidence provided the circumstantial evidence points to guilt
to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." 60 ) In another
case, the court of appeal reversed a verdict for the plaintiff, saying that the
trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
53. Leach v.State, 132 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1961).
54. Brooks v. State, 117 So.2d 482, 486 (Fla. 1960).
55. City of Coral Gables v. Brasher, 132 So.2d 442 (Fla. App. 1961).
56. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1961).
57. Green v. Hood, 120 So.2d 223 (Fla. App. 1960).
58. 117 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
59. Id. at 733.
60. Ibid.
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The jury had to infer that the defendant was negligent in providing an
inadequate ladder (the court held that this inference was not established to
the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences) and then infer that this
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's fall.61
Thus, in every case of this nature, the trial judge, in considering the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, must first determine whether the
jury must make an inference upon an inference in order to find for the
plaintiff, and second, he must decide whether the circumstantial evidence
presented has established the first inference to the exclusion of all other
reasonable inferences. When he has done this, and has granted the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, he may be reversed by the court
of appeal on the grounds that the first inference was not an inference,
but rather a fact directly proved, or because the first inference was (in the
view of the appellate court) established to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences. 62 This writer foresees great difficulty, both on the trial
and appellate levels, in determining how many inferences a jury must make
to grant recovery and how an inference may be satisfactorily established.
The court in the case last cited further confused this area when it stated
that "the negligence is not shown by piling inference upon inference in
succession, but rather is indicated, and might be found by a jury, from what
63
may be described as parallel inferences arising under the circumstances.
NEGATIVE TESTIMONY

In a case involving the question of whether or not a train whistle had
blown at a crossing, the court of appeal held that negative, testimony (the
plaintiff's witnesses said they did not hear it blow) will not make an issue
in the face of positive testimony (that it had been blown). 4 But the
supreme court reversed, saying that "if a jury decides that the attention
of the witness whose testimony is negative in character, is actually directed
to the fact or situation, about which he later testifies, regardless of the
reason therefor, said jury may consider such negative testimony and accord
to it the weight it may deem proper." 65
PRESUMPTIONS

When a defendant has been previously adjudicated insane, it is presumed that he remains so until it is shown that his sanity has been restored.
In Johnson v. State"6 the defendant offered evidence of his prior adjudication
61. McCormick Shipping Corp. v. Warner, 129 So.2d 448 (Fla. App. 1961).
62. Belden v. Lynch, 126 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1961).
63. Id. at 581.
64. Apalachicola No. R.R. v. Tyus, 114 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959).
65. Tyus v. Apalachicola No. R.R., 130 So.2d 580, 585 (Fla. 1961).
66. 118 So.2d 234 (Fla. App. 1960).
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of insanity and also a discharge certificate from the state hospital to which
he had been confined. The court stated that while this certificate would
be prima facie proof of sanity in a proceeding for restoration to sanity, 67
this presumption does not extend to a criminal proceeding. The fact that
the defendant introduced the certificate was immaterial. The certificate
was proper evidence for the jury to consider in determining whether the
presumption of insanity had been rebutted, but no more.
TIMELY OBJECTION

The established "timely objection" rule was applied by the court in
Raco v. State, 8 which held that the defendant's acceptance of the trial
court's ruling on a cross examination question precluded an attack on the

ruling on appeal. In Ailer v. State 9 the court noted that this rule applies
even when the trial court judge has wrongly failed to intervene, sua sponte,
in the absence of an objection. But in this case, remarks made by the
prosecuting attorney in his closing argument about other crimes of the
defendant were "of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may
entirely destroy their sinister influence."7 0 Thus, the situation gave rise
to an exception to the "timely objection" rule and became grounds for
the granting of a new trial.
COMMENT BY THE JUDGE

In Lassiter v. State7t the trial judge was held to have invaded the
province of the jury and to have committed prejudical error when he
commented that there was no inconsistency between a state witness' testimony at a coroner's inquest and his trial testimony on the issue of the
defendant's guilt.
EVIDENCE OF MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES

When a defendant has pleaded guilty and declined a jury trial, the
state may introduce evidence of the crime over the defendant's objection that
this practice allows the state to prove its case as though the defendant were
being tried by a jury on a not guilty plea.72 When the trial court has discretion as to the penalty to be inflicted on the defendant, either side may
introduce evidence to show mitigating or aggravating circumstances to aid
the court in determining the extent of the sentence to be imposed.78
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

FLA. STAT. § 394.22(16) (1961).
114 So.2d 485 (Fla. App. 1959).
114 So.2d 348 (Fla. App. 1959).
Id. at 351.
118 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1960).
Davis v. State, 123 So.2d 703, 709 (Fla. 1960).
FLA. STAT. § 921.13 (1961).

